(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding other than a grand jury proceeding, a lawyer
shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the
facts are adverse.
COMMENT
The advocate's task is to present the client's case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal. However, an advocate does not vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause; the tribunal is responsible for assessing its probative value.
Representations by a Lawyer
An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation,
but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein,
for litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by
someone on the client's behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule
3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as
in an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly
be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be
true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances
where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.
The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or
assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance
with Rule 1.2(d), see the Comment to that Rule. See also the Comment to Rule
8.4(b).
Misleading Legal Argument
Legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes
dishonesty toward the tribunal. A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested
exposition of the law, but must recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities.
False Evidence
When evidence that a lawyer knows to be false is provided by a person who is
not the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of the client's
wishes.
When false evidence is offered by the client, however, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential and the duty of candor to the court. Upon ascertaining that material evidence is false, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered or, if it has been offered, that its false character should immediately be disclosed. If the persuasion is ineffective, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures.
Except in the defense of a criminal accused, the rule generally recognized is that, if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the other party. Such a disclosure can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truthfinding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court.
Perjury by a Criminal Defendant
Whether an advocate for a criminally accused has the same duty of disclosure
has been intensely debated. While it is agreed that the lawyer should seek to
persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony, there has been dispute
concerning the lawyer's duty when that persuasion fails. If the confrontation
with the client occurs before trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw. Withdrawal
before trial may not be possible, however, either because trial is imminent,
or because the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial
itself, or because no other counsel is available.
The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious. The lawyer's effort to rectify the situation can increase the likelihood of the client's being convicted as well as open the possibility of a prosecution for perjury. On the other hand, if the lawyer does not exercise control over the proof, the lawyer participates, although in a merely passive way, in deception of the court.
Three resolutions of this dilemma have been proposed. One is to permit the accused to testify by a narrative without guidance through the lawyer's questioning. This compromises both contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel. Another suggested resolution, of relatively recent origin, is that the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the perjury is that of the client. This is a coherent solution but makes the advocate a knowing instrument of perjury.
The other resolution of the dilemma is that the lawyer must reveal the client's perjury if necessary to rectify the situation. A criminal accused has a right to the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify and a right of confidential communication with counsel. However, an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury. Furthermore, an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional ethics but under the law as well, to avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other falsification of evidence. See Rule 1.2(d).
Remedial Measures
If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper
course ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that
fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation.
If withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should
make disclosure to the court. It is for the court then to determine what should
be done--making a statement about the maker to the trier of fact, ordering a
mistrial, or perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of the client,
the client may controvert the lawyer's version of their communication when the
lawyer discloses the situation to the court. If there is an issue whether the
client has committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the client in resolution
of the issue, and a mistrial may be unavoidable. An unscrupulous client might
in this way attempt to produce a series of mistrials and thus escape prosecution.
However, a second such encounter could be construed as a deliberate abuse of
the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to further representation.
Constitutional Requirements
The general rule, that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with
respect to a material fact, even that of a client, applies to defense counsel
in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the definition of
the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by constitutional
provisions for due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. In some
jurisdictions these provisions have been construed to require that counsel present
an accused as a witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows
the testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under these Rules
is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.
Duration of Obligation
A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false
evidence has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably
definite point for the termination of the obligation.
Refusing to Offer Proof Believed to Be False
Generally speaking, a lawyer has authority to refuse to offer testimony or other
proof that the lawyer believes is untrustworthy. Offering such proof may reflect
adversely on the lawyer's ability to discriminate in the quality of evidence
and thus impair the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate. In criminal cases,
however, a lawyer may, in some jurisdictions, be denied this authority by constitutional
requirements governing the right to counsel.
Ex Parte Proceedings
Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side
of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflicting
position is expected to be presented by the opposing party. However, in an ex
parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order,
there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an
ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The
judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just consideration.
The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures
of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes
are necessary to an informed decision. Since a grand jury proceeding is a preliminary
step in the institution of a criminal charge, the prosecutor is not required
to present all "material'' facts. Otherwise, the grand jury proceeding
could become unduly burdened with numerous witnesses, every piece of tangible
evidence, and inquiries into possible defense theories, both as to guilt and
as to punishment.
COMPARISON WITH FORMER ALABAMA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Paragraph (a)(1) is substantially identical to DR 7-102(A)(5), which provided
that a lawyer shall not "knowingly make a false statement of law
or fact.''
Paragraph (a)(2) is implicit in DR 7-102(A)(3), which provided that "a lawyer shall not . . . knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.''
With regard to paragraph (a)(3), the first sentence of this subparagraph is similar to DR 7-102(A)(4), which provided that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use'' perjured testimony or false evidence. The second sentence of paragraph (a)(3) resolves an ambiguity in the former Code concerning the action required of a lawyer who discovers that the lawyer has offered perjured testimony or false evidence. DR 7-102(A)(4), quoted above, did not expressly deal with this situation, but the prohibition against "use'' of false evidence can be construed to preclude carrying through with a case based on such evidence when that fact has become known during the trial. Prior Alabama DR 7-102(B)(1) provided that a lawyer "who receives information clearly establishing that . . . his client has . . . perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall withdraw from employment.''
Paragraph (c) confers discretion on the lawyer to refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer "reasonably believes'' is false. This gives the lawyer more latitude than DR 7-102(A)(4), which prohibited the lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer "knows'' is false.
There was no counterpart in the former Code to paragraph (d).
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